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Andrew Pichette 
Instructor: Nawragh Chaulagain 
The Rise of Boko Haram: An Analysis of Failed Governance 
 Abstract: The Boko Haram threat in Nigeria has been the subject of constant review as of 
the last few years. Underlying causes as well as the organizational ideology have consistently 
been the subject of investigation. While popularly considered to be an Islamic extremist group, 
academic thought has proposed that Islam is used as a means of legitimization rather than 
motivation, and that socio-economic and political realities are far more relevant to explaining 
the activities of Boko Haram. The purpose of this essay is to examine the origins of Boko Haram, 
how the government has reacted, and propose solutions to the deeply rooted issues in northern 
Nigeria. 
 Global terrorism is an extremely dangerous new threat in human history. Beginning in the 
mid-late twentieth century, the phenomenon of terrorism has been steadily on the rise, 
particularly in unstable regions such as Africa and the Middle East. These illicit organizations 
have dozens of motives, ranging from state secession to religious sectarianism to governmental 
overthrow. Boko Haram is one of the latest groups to burst onto the scene in Africa, where they 
have become a destabilizing force in Nigeria and the surrounding countries to a lesser extent. 
The rise of Boko Haram has been a violent, turbulent blur as they have expanded their 
membership and operations drastically since 2009, the year which marks the beginning of their 
terrorist operations. Many theories circulate regarding the societal causes for Boko Haram 
activity, ranging from the relative deprivation theory to religious extremism or failure of 
democratic governance. The organization has rapidly accelerated since 2009, even going so far 
as to attack a UN embassy in the capital of Nigeria. While the full extent of Boko Haram’s 
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resources, manpower, and motivations are unknown, it is clear that the group must be dealt with. 
Terrorism is a major threat anywhere, but the Nigerian case is all the more dangerous due to 
Nigeria's massive proven oil reserves. In order to restore security, promote peace and prosperity, 
and insure the rights of Nigerians are protected, the Nigerian government must take a stronger 
role in eliminating the Boko Haram threat.  
Synopsis of Boko Haram: 
 Boko Haram, more formally known as Jama'atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'Awati Wal-Jihad, 
originated in 2001 as the Yusufiyya, led by Mohammed Yusuf. Yusuf was a Nigerian Islamic 
radical who studied in Chad and the Niger Republic before returning to Nigeria to form the 
Yusufiyya.1 Over the course of eight years of fairly peaceful activity and the gathering of some 
280,000 members, the Yusufiyya developed into what is known today as Boko Haram. July 2009 
saw the violent radicalization of the sect, when Boko Haram members participated in a riot 
against a new law requiring motorcyclists to wear helmets. During this riot, police forces cracked 
down, arresting several Boko Haram members including Yusuf. By the end of the day, Yusuf 
and several other Boko Haram members had been killed extra-judicially.2 The riot and its violent 
resolution are credited with the increase in Boko Haram violence across Nigeria.3 Ideologically 
speaking, Boko Haram is violently anti-Western, as explained by their name alone, which 
roughly translates to "Western culture/education is forbidden/sinful." This ideology is 
underscored by Islamic extremism adopted from Al-Qaeda as a result of the alliance between the 
two groups.4 It must also be understood that Boko Haram is violently opposed to the current 
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Nigerian state, which is founded on essentially secular and Western principles of state due to 
earlier British colonialism. The extremist group promotes Sharia law as an alternative to the 
current state, claiming it would end governmental corruption as well as better promote the needs 
of the people. While moderate Sharia law has been enacted in some parts of northern Nigeria, 
Boko Haram seeks to completely displace secular law and install strict, fundamentalist Sharia 
courts in Nigeria.5 This goal necessitates complete overthrow of the state at all levels of 
government, making Boko Haram a threat to national security as well as the lives of endangered 
Nigerians. 
 Since the 2009 riot, Boko Haram has become significantly more militant in their actions. 
The estimated loss of life since 2009 is in the range of multiple thousands, with high estimates 
claiming some 6,000 deaths in 2014 alone. While most of these deaths are focused in the north, 
against other Muslims, all of Nigeria feels close to the issue. Most of these deaths are accounted 
for by bombs, suicide attacks, and gun attacks on or near government institutions, such as police 
or military bases, although attacks on civilians have become more frequent.6 Attacks on civilians 
are either raids on villages with the intent to destabilize the state, or attacks on Muslim mosques 
to discourage pacifist clerics from attacking Boko Haram ideology.7 Not included in casualty 
reports are the massive population displacements or kidnappings that have occurred during Boko 
Haram's reign of terror. A conservative estimate would put the displaced population in the 
hundreds of thousands, if not much greater than one million. Accurate statistics regarding 
kidnappings are difficult to acquire, as there is much uncertainty in the matter. However, the 
Chibok school incident, in which almost 300 girls were kidnapped, paints a disturbing possibility 
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regarding Boko Haram's tactics. Videos released afterwards by Boko Haram representatives 
joyfully proclaimed that the girls had been either sold into slavery or forced into marriage with 
Boko Haram fighters, and that they would continue this practice at every given opportunity.  
Causes and Concerns of Boko Haram: 
 The factors concerning the rise of Boko Haram are many and diverse. The two main 
theories will be discussed here, then arranged accordingly to present a viable explanation for 
Boko Haram as an entity.  
 Relative Deprivation Theory: The deprivation theory is a simple, widely recognized 
explanation for terror. The fundamental belief underlying this idea is that people who are not 
having their basic needs fulfilled are more likely to resort to violence, and that poverty is a key 
factor in explaining terrorism in less developed parts of the world. In Nigeria, the numbers do 
correlate with this explanation to some degree, as the northern regions associated with Boko 
Haram activity are, in fact, the poorest of Nigeria. Poverty rates as well as the HDI testify to the 
poor quality and safety of life in these areas.8 Also important to the deprivation theory is the way 
people in these areas view themselves.9 In this context, it is important to review the ideology of 
Boko Haram. The government has done little to resolve issues of poverty in the north, nor has it 
displayed much interest in doing so.10 This apparent indifference, according to relative 
deprivation theory, would then imply that the root cause of Boko Haram activity is the poor 
economic conditions in Nigeria coupled with the state's failure to rectify these conditions. Before 
lending too much weight to this explanation, some key details must be accounted for. First, this 
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theory fails to compensate for the overwhelming numbers of the impoverished who do not resort 
to violence to solve their problems. It also provides no compelling justification for recent studies 
concerning the origins of individual terrorists. These studies generally point to one conclusion; 
economic and educational backgrounds are uncorrelated with terrorism.11 Accounting for these 
two contradictions to relative deprivation theory, it is still important to note that Boko Haram 
activity is focused in the most impoverished areas of Nigeria, which implies poverty in itself is 
likely a part of the problem, though not the whole solution. 
 State Failure Theory: A second outlook regarding Boko Haram's origin is the state failure 
explanation. This theory, applied to Nigeria, relies on the notion that the state has failed to 
complete the tasks required of it. This theory borrows heavily from the same evidence espoused 
in the relative deprivation theory, which focuses on socio-economic circumstances. Prosperity is 
determined as one of the key factors of successful government, and as referenced earlier, 
northern Nigeria is brutally impoverished. This theory also relies on political moods to explain 
the rise of terror, and the primary piece of evidence fails in the case of Boko Haram. Most often 
cited is the 2011 election of Goodluck Jonathan, a member of the Christian South. Due to 
Nigeria's tradition of political zoning, the presidency typically shifts from north to south every 
two terms. To simplify, this puts a northern Muslim in office, then a southern Christian. In 2010, 
however, the Muslim president passed away, putting Goodluck Jonathan into power. According 
to the political zoning tradition, he would not run for reelection in 2011 to allow the north one 
more presidential term. Contrary to tradition, however, he ran for reelection and won the 2011 
presidency, much to the chagrin of northern party members. Popular theory proposes that this 
abandonment of party politics caused radicals in the north to take up arms to attack the state. 
This all sounds well and good in theory, until the chronology is taken into account; Boko Haram 
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became violent during the Muslim presidency.12 While this breaking of political tradition may 
have caused more people to feel politically disenfranchised and rush into the arms of Boko 
Haram, it was only a major step in bolstering the organization, not starting it. 
 Another facet of the state failure theory credits the failure of the Nigerian state to be 
inclusive as the cause of insurgent activity.13 Troublingly, the Nigerian government for the last 
one hundred years has been founded on violence.14 Nigeria had formerly been a colonial holding 
of the British, and experienced multiple military coups once the British withdrew. Violence has 
been the favored instrument of successive governments based on coercion rather than 
cooperation.15 Note that, while failing to improve conditions in Nigeria, the government has also 
made itself distant from the people by becoming the home of a privileged, inaccessible political 
elite. This elite, more often than not, has failed to resolve national problems, and when it makes 
an attempt, it is often through the medium of violence. As discussed later, the government is 
remarkably inept even in this field. Unfortunately for the Nigerian people, this ineptitude has 
increased Boko Haram activity as well as significantly worsened the conditions for citizens in 
areas known to be in Boko Haram's operational zone. 
 When taken separately, these two theories cannot suffice to fully explain the phenomena 
of Boko Haram's reign of terror. Put together, the evidence appears more convincing, although 
only moderately so. The Nigerian government has certainly failed to provide economic security 
to the Muslim north, where the violence originated. It also has failed to provide basic rule of law, 
any form of transparency, fair elections, or fair government.16 Historically, Nigeria has been 
plagued by violence under the rule of military dictatorships as well as a general lack of effective 
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security within the nation. This atmosphere of violence has bred particularly fertile grounds for 
armed revolt and opposition to the state. In the north, the federal government is seen as both 
corrupt and indifferent toward the needs of the people. This, coupled with increasing poverty and 
no apparent hope of reforming the system from within, has made radicals in Nigeria feel outside 
the system to a degree which mandates replacing it. As seen before 2009, this started as political 
protest, but the July riot provoked Boko Haram to begin its campaign of violence. Violent, 
unregulated state intervention can be seen as the catalyst for the ongoing cycle of violence in 
Nigeria. 
Crisis Resolution: 
 The Nigerian government has failed to handle Boko Haram adequately from day one. 
Warnings from early in the rise of Boko Haram were ignored by the government.17 Worse, when 
the government finally did react by deploying the Joint Security Force to engage the Islamic 
fundamentalists in 2005, the threat was seriously mishandled. Information gathered by police and 
military assets reports that members of the organization had been sent to hotbeds of terrorism 
like Pakistan to receive training in the manufacture of explosive ordinance as well as tactical 
training.18 Despite clear knowledge of the threat, little more action was taken to follow up on this 
potential danger. Now that prevention is completely out of the picture, the government has 
resorted to violent crackdowns in hopes of eliminating the terrorist threat. 
 Even this strategy, however, has been massively flawed in its implementation. Instead of 
targeting selectively with the intent of removing Boko Haram assets, the Joint Security Force has 
earned itself a reputation for brutality almost equal to that of their enemy. Nigerian security 
forces have reportedly caused massive damage to private property, killed citizens, performed 
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numerous extra-judicial killings, failed to follow proper investigatory measures, performed 
torture, and utilized dragnet arrests.19 Instead of resolving the problem, the government has 
instead alienated the people even more. This is especially dangerous when operating a counter-
terrorist plan, which requires the support of the people to help locate and eliminate Boko Haram 
assets. Instead of encouraging public support, the Joint Security Force has driven more 
aggravated youth into the arms of Boko Haram, further fueling the fire.  
 The first policy reform necessary to bring about peace in Nigeria is readily apparent; 
resolve the crisis of government. Restoring faith in government is necessary to legitimize attacks 
on Boko Haram and any incidental damage that may be caused. Democratic reform will 
undoubtedly play a major role in this process, as fighting political corruption has become a major 
selling point of Boko Haram's ideology. Providing free and fair elections, preferably with 
international oversight to lend legitimacy to the process, will bring in new political actors 
capable of improving the system and supporting citizens needs. Installing an independent 
agency, again with the possibility of international support, and tasking it to investigate cases of 
corruption within the state apparatus would also significantly improve approval of the 
government. 
 Second, the inadequacies of the security response must be addressed. The Joint Security 
Force has acted with complete and utter disregard for the constitutional rights of the Nigerian 
people, and in doing so, has offended and radicalized them. War criminals must be brought to 
court for their crimes, and officers must be better equipped to control their troops in the field. 
This means a complete reform of the military administration, which also mandates a replacement 
of leadership. For the time it takes to institute this revamping of the system, an international 
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security force may be required to continue assaults on Boko Haram assets to maintain security in 
Nigeria.  
Conclusion:  
 The rise of Boko Haram terrorism has been a slow and painful process in Nigeria. 
Despite having had the opportunity to quell the threat, the Nigerian government has failed time 
and time again to properly respond. While the factors playing into the birth of this particular 
extremist group are not completely clear as of yet, it is obvious that many problems have 
aggravated the youth of northern Nigeria to the point of violence. In order to resolve the violence 
attributed to Boko Haram, the state must legitimize itself democratically. Corruption must be 
combated, and economic aid programs must be utilized to improve conditions in the volatile 
North. Until economic recovery is accomplished, the government must regulate its military more 
effectively so as to avoid antagonizing Nigerians and driving them into the arms of Boko Haram. 
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